Current Project:

My thesis focusses on F. W. J. Schelling’s (1775-1854) “philosophical methodology” as it is expressed through intellectual intuition and metaphysical empiricism. The significance I ascribe to these twin terms are twofold. On the one hand, they both point to a form of experiential knowing that attempts to transcend normal empirical cognition (i.e., the kind of cognition that depends on the conformity between concept and sensation) and on the other hand, they represent a bridge between Schelling’s early and late works.

The reduction of experience to empirical cognition occurred most forcefully in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. There the ‘bounds of possible experience’ were determined in accordance with the pure concepts of the understanding (Kant’s famous table of categories). Thus, an experience is only ‘possible’ according to Kant if it can be conceptually determined. When it comes to understanding altered states of consciousness (like the psychedelic experience), however, this empirical model of cognition falls short.

The term “ineffable” is commonly used to describe those experiences that seem to resist conceptual determination. Thus, the empirical model of cognition has no means of verifying the legitimacy (or even the actuality) of such experiences. This inabillity is most evident when the scientific community resorts to explaining altered states of consciousness (like the psychedelic experience) as “hallucinations.” The problem with this, however, is that some of the most positive effects of psychedelic therapy, for instance, seem to be contingent (and perhaps even proportionate to) the “ineffability” of the experience — a characteristic that is not typical of other commonly considered forms of hallucination. At the very least this highlights the need for a non-empirical account of experience in domains like psychiatry.

The second aim of my thesis is to draw a historiographical connection between Schelling’s use of intellectual intuition and metaphysical empiricism. Schelling has long been regarded a ‘protean’ thinker who failed to hold any consistent philosophical commitments, although scholars began challenging this around the middle of the 20th century. Thus, contemporary Schelling scholarship is very much in the process of rediscovering the connections between his early and late works.

Schelling adopted the term “intellectual intuition” in 1795 and continued to develop its meaning and application well into the 19th century. However, there was a sudden break in his productivity after 1809 prompted by the death of his wife, Caroline. Afterwards Schelling began to rely more heavily on the spoken word, publishing his last written work in 1812. It was not until the Berlin Lectures (1841-2) that Schelling introduced his new method of “metaphysical empiricism.” By establishing a relationship between intellectual intuition and metaphysical empiricism I hope to identify a methodological thread that runs throughout Schelling’s entire philosophical evolution.

Peer-Reviewed Publications:

Talks (selected):

  • 2022: “The Early Schelling and the Unconditioned”, North American Schelling Society
  • 2023: “Organic Construction in Schelling’s Early Philosophy”, Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy
  • 2024: (upcoming) “Some Thoughts on Organicism and Technology”, Australasian Association of Philosophy